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EQUAL PROTECTION DENIED IN NEW YORK
TO SOME FAMILY LAW LITIGANTS IN
SUPREME COURT: AN ASSIGNED COUNSEL
DILEMMA FOR THE COURTS
Robert M. Elardo*
In New York, the supreme court and the family court enjoy con-
current jurisdiction over many types of family law cases.1 Among
them are those concerning child custody, child and spousal support,
adoption, abuse and neglect, parental rights termination, and pa-
ternity. For some types of cases, such as those concerning adoption
and child guardianship, the surrogate's court also has concurrent
jurisdiction.2 The supreme court has general jurisdiction and can
technically hear cases that the family or surrogate's court may ad-
judicate. 3 As a practical matter, the supreme court does not exer-
cise its theoretical jurisdiction over some of these case types.4
* Robert M. Elardo has been the managing attorney of the Erie County Bar
Association Volunteer Lawyers Project, Inc. for the past seventeen years. During that
time, he has served as president of the National Association of Pro Bono Coordina-
tors, co-chair of the New York Pro Bono Coordinators Network, and consultant to the
American Bar Association's Center for Pro Bono. He was a member of the New
York State Bar Association President's Committee on Access to Justice, and remains
a member of the NYSBA Committee on Legal Aid. He has been a trainer on numer-
ous pro bono topics for the ABA, NYSBA, and in Erie County. Prior to his time at
the Volunteer Lawyers Project, he was an associate member of the law faculty at
Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Although the Family Court Act appears to grant "exclusive original jurisdic-
tion" to the family court over many types of cases, it actually only creates concurrent
jurisdiction with the supreme court. Article 6, section 7 of the New York State Con-
stitution declares that the supreme court has "general original jurisdiction in law and
equity." New York Family Court Act (FCA) section 411, entitled, "Exclusive original
jurisdiction," describes the concurrent jurisdiction as follows:
When used in this act, 'exclusive original jurisdiction' means that the pro-
ceedings over which the family court is given such jurisdiction must be
originated in the family court in the manner prescribed by this act. The pro-
visions of this act shall in no way limit or impair the jurisdiction of the su-
preme court as set forth in section seven of article six of the constitution of
the state of New York.
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 411 (McKinney 2001).
2. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACr § 201 (McKinney 2001).
3. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7; Kagen v. Kagen, 236 N.E.2d 475 (N.Y. 1968); Levy v.
Levy, 362 N.Y.S.2d 15 (App. Div. 1974).
4. E.g., JOSEPH A. Cox, JOSEPH T. ARONSON & STANDISH F. MEDINA, N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICE SCPA § 1702.01, 17-23 (1996).
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Nevertheless, the supreme court routinely exercises its concur-
rent jurisdiction in certain family law areas, one of the most impor-
tant of which is child custody. Child custody is so important that
the New York Family Court Act (FCA) section 261 provides liti-
gants in child custody matters with a right to counsel: "Persons in-
volved in certain family court proceedings may face the
infringement of fundamental interests and rights, including the loss
of a child's society ... and therefore have a constitutional right to
counsel in such proceedings."5
Section 262(a) of the FCA details several types of cases in which
the parties have the right to assigned counsel. FCA section 262(c)
further provides that "any order for the assignment of counsel is-
sued under this part shall be implemented as provided in article
eighteen-B of the county law."'6 This statutory scheme results in
indigent parents7 and respondents 8 in child custody matters being
routinely provided assigned counsel and, thus, having protected
what FCA section 261 declares to be their "constitutional right to
counsel"-at least if their case happens to be in the family court.9
5. The language is meant to cover child custody, § 262(a)(iii), (v), as well as sev-
eral other types of cases covered by FCA section 261's sister statute, FCA section 262.
These cases include respondents in child protective proceedings, § 262(a)(i); both par-
ties in family offense proceedings, § 262(a)(ii); various proceedings regarding foster
care, § 262(a)(iv); people being held in contempt of court for violation of a prior court
order, § 262(a)(vi); the parent of a child in an adoption proceeding who opposes the
child's adoption , § 262(a)(vii); the respondent in a paternity proceeding,
§ 262(a)(viii); and other proceedings in which the judge finds that the New York or
United States Constitution mandates the assignment of counsel, § 262(b). For the
legislative history, see infra notes 84-88.
6. Id. § 262(c); see also N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 art. 18-B (McKinney 1991).
The compensation for the assigned attorney is paid by the county or by the city in
which the county is wholly contained. Id. § 722(4).
7. N.Y. FAM. CT. Act § 262(a)(v) (McKinney 2001).
8. Id. § 262(iii).
9. Laws of 1975, Chapter 682, included the creation of FCA sections 261 and 262.
It was drafted by the Office of Court Administration. Laws of 1975, Chapter 682, Bill
Jacket, Letter from Michael R. Juviler, New York Office of Court Administration, to
Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (July 22, 1975). The legislative history makes
it clear that FCA sections 261 and 262 only set out in statutory form constitutional
rights that many, including the Office of Court Administration, believed already ex-
isted in New York. Id. at 1-2; Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF
THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY
COURT AND FAMILY LAW 2 ; Letter from E. Judson Jennings, Family Court Section,
Office of Projects Development, Appellate Division First Department, to Judah
Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (July 18, 1975); Division of the Budget, 30-Day Bill
Budget Report on Bills, Examiner David C. W. Sawyer, dated July 21, 1975. The
widely held view that FCA sections 261 and 262 merely codify constitutional require-
ments was based upon a broad reading of In re Ella B., 285 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972),
which involved an appeal from a family court neglect proceeding where the child was
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Unfortunately, this right is only guaranteed in family court pro-
ceedings. No similar statutes expressly recognize or provide for the
implementation of a similar right to assigned counsel in supreme
court.
Interestingly, though, the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act
(SCPA) expressly provides for the right to assigned counsel for
parents and others that find themselves in essentially identical
types of cases that may be heard in surrogate's court.' ° SCPA sec-
tion 407 was enacted just two years after FCA sections 261 and
262.11 This quick follow up was no doubt brought about, at least in
part, because when the legislation to create FCA sections 261 and
262 was still pending, the Surrogates' Association had already rec-
ognized that litigants in the surrogates' courts were being inappro-
priately left out in the cold. It wrote:
The declaration of public policy set forth in new Section 261
would seem to cover all courts having jurisdiction over any of
the proceedings that are specified. However, in the amend-
taken from parental custody. The court found that the appellant not only had the
right to counsel, but also the right to be advised that an attorney would be appointed
if she could not afford one. According to Chief Judge Fuld, "In our view, an indigent
parent, faced with loss of a child's society ... is entitled to the assistance of counsel.
A parent's concern for the liberty of the child, as well as for his care and control,
involves too fundamental an interest and right to be relinquished to the state without
the opportunity for a hearing, with assigned counsel if the parent lacks the means to
retain a lawyer." In re Ella B., 285 N.E.2d 288, 290 (N.Y. 1972) (citations omitted).
Chief Judge Fuld found that denying the parent legal assistance was tantamount to a
denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 288. Some courts have disagreed
with the broad reading of In re Ella B., and have said that FCA section 262 extended
the right to counsel recognized by In re Ella B. to custody proceedings. McNeill v.
Ressel, 692 N.Y.S.2d 735 (App. Div. 1999); Patricia L. v. Steven L., 506 N.Y.S.2d 198,
200-01 (App. Div. 1986). Nonetheless, whether or not In re Ella B. required that child
custody cases be included in FCA section 262 does not seem worth quibbling about.
In People v. Smith, 465 N.E.2d 336, 339 (N.Y. 1984), the New York Court of Appeals,
citing In re Ella B., wrote that FCA section 262 was "a recognition that due process
and equal protection require the assistance of counsel when rights and interests as
fundamental as those involved in the parent-child relationship are at stake."
10. The structure and wording of the New York Surrogate's Court Procedure Act
section 407 closely mirrors that of FCA section 262. SCPA section 407 (1)(a) is identi-
cal to FCA section 262(a), except that the SCPA section substitutes the word "surro-
gate" for the word "judge." Both statutes have a series of subsections detailing
essentially similar circumstances when assigned counsel is to be provided. Both stat-
utes also have a subsection (b) that allows the assignment of counsel in other cases if
the judge determines that the New York or United States Constitution mandates that
counsel be assigned. Each statute ends with a subsection stating that any order for
the assignment of counsel must be implemented as provided in article eighteen-B of
the county law.
11. SCPA section 407 was enacted pursuant to L. 1977, c. 682, § 10 and was made
effective January 1, 1978.
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ments to the County Law relating... to... expenses of counsel
assigned to these indigent persons, the sections relate only to
proceedings in the Family Court .... We thus have the anoma-
lous situation of a legislative declaration of public policy which
would seem to cover the Surrogates' Courts and at the same
time provisions for implementing that policy which relate only
to the Family Court and exclude the Surrogates' Courts. This
confusion would not be a reason for disapproving the bill. It
might leave the Surrogates' Courts in a position where counsel
would necessarily be provided without any means of compensat-
ing counsel. 12
With the enactment of SCPA section 407 two years later, this
"confusion" came to an end. 3 The bill's sponsor in the senate dis-
cussed the recent statutory changes providing for assigned counsel
in family court and addressed the surrogate's court omission:
Inexplicably, the statute failed to recognize that in proceedings
such as adoption proceedings and some proceedings for termi-
nation of parental rights, the Surrogate's Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Family Court and did not extend the right
to counsel to such proceedings in that Court. As a conforming,
if not constitutionally required change, this bill effects necessary
conforming amendments to include the Surrogate's Court.14
12. Laws of 1975, ch. 682, Bill Jacket, Letter, from Paul Powers, Sec'y Emeritus,
The Surrogates' Ass'n of the State of N.Y., to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Gover-
nor, 1-2 (July 22, 1975).
13. New York County Law section 722(4), article 18-B was also amended to in-
clude payment by the counties for assignments of counsel made pursuant to SCPA
section 407.
14. Memorandum of Senator Joseph R. Pisani re Ch. 682 of laws of 1977, in N.Y.
LEGISLATIVE SERVS., INC., NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL: 1977, S. 6835,
A. 545, 225-26 (1977). Senator Pisani was the bill's sponsor in the senate. See also
Laws of 1977, Ch. 682, Bill Jacket, Letter from Frederick Marshall, Legislative Coun-
sel, State of NY Office of Court Administration, to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the
Governor (Aug. 1, 1977), in which it is written:
This measure fulfills the mandate of counsel to indigent adults facing the loss
of custody of a child in Surrogate's Court. In re Ella B., 285 N.Y.2d 288
(N.Y. 1972). The Office of Court Administration and the Family Court Ad-
visory and Rules Committee support this measure which brings the practice
of assigning counsel in surrogate's court into accord with the requirement in
similar proceedings in family court. All standards for assigned counsel in
custody and adoption matters in Surrogate's Court should be identical to those
in Family Court. (emphasis added).
See also Laws of 1977, ch. 682, Bill Jacket, Letter from John M. Keane, President of
the Surrogates' Ass'n of the State of New York, to Judah Gribetz (July 25, 1977);
Letter from Milton Belier, Legislative Dir. for the Legal Aid Society [of New York
City] to Judah Gribetz (July 27, 1977); Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.,
REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMITTrEE
ON TRUSTS, ESTATES AND SURROGATE'S COURT (undated). This correcting legisla-
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Unfortunately, there is still no clear statewide pronouncement
providing for assigned counsel in similar cases adjudicated in su-
preme court. A comparison of supreme court rules shows that
New York's four judicial departments treat the issue inconsistently.
The Second Department rule is by far the most helpful. Section
678.11, entitled, "Assignment of Counsel," begins as follows:
Assignment of counsel by the Family Court, Supreme Court or
Surrogate's Court to represent indigent adults in proceedings
pursuant to section 262 of the Family Court Act, shall be made
from law guardian panels designation [sic] pursuant to Part 679
of this Title (The rules of the Appellate Division, Second
Department) .5
This section specifically discusses how supreme court (and surro-
gate's court) judges are to refer litigants to assigned counsel pursu-
ant to FCA section 262.16 It does not, however, explain whether
such assignments are a discretionary power or a mandated duty.
Interestingly, although the Second Department includes the Sec-
ond, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Judicial Districts, section 678.11
falls under Part 678, which is entitled "Assigned Counsel Plan Sec-
ond and Eleventh Judicial Districts" and apparently only applies to
those two districts. 7 The rules provide no plan for the Ninth or
Tenth Districts.
The First Department rule is entitled, "Assignment of counsel in
Family Court," but the actual text of the rule does not specifically
limit its scope to family court proceedings. 8
tion "inexplicably" failed to include a provision regarding counsel for parents "seek-
ing custody or contesting the substantial infringement of his or her right to custody."
Although this protection was provided for in the original enactment of FCA section
262 in 1975, it was not added to SCPA section 407 until 1986.
15. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 678.11 (2002). Compensation for
assigned attorneys under Part 679 is provided pursuant to N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35 (Mc-
Kinney 2001). N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 679.11 (2002).
16. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262 (McKinney 2001) (providing means for
referring cases for assigned counsel).
17. Section 678.11 looks like a "model rule" but does not solve the problem. The
three legal service providers from the Second and Eleventh Districts that responded
to my informal survey, see infra note 35, all indicated that low income clients had
difficulty obtaining assigned counsel. One advocate said that in Kings County (Sec-
ond District) low income clients "[o]ften [ ] remain unrepresented. This is scandal-
ous!" Survey Response of Nancy S. Erickson, Senior Trial Attorney, Legal Services
for New York City, Brooklyn, New York (Aug. 27, 2001).
18. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 606.7 (2001) states in full, "Counsel to
be assigned pursuant to Family Court Act, section 262, shall be selected from such
panels as have been established in the First Judicial Department in conformity with
Article 18-B of the County Law, as amended."
2002] 1129
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
The Third and Fourth Department rules do not specifically ad-
dress this issue or mention FCA section 262.19 In 1998, however,
the Fourth Department heard a series of appeals from a matter in
which the Herkimer County Supreme Court had appointed as-
signed counsel for both a family offense issue and a custody issue.2°
The Fourth Department apparently assumed that the supreme
court's appointing counsel was proper and that the indigent's right
to assigned counsel stemmed from the FCA.21 In discussing
whether the appellant had the right to have a third appointed coun-
sel for her custody issue (she had dismissed the first two attorneys
that the court had assigned her), the court wrote, "An indigent
party's right to assigned counsel under the Family Court Act is not
absolute. ' 22 In finding that the supreme court "did not abuse its
discretion in denying petitioner's request for new assigned coun-
sel," the Fourth Department cited a series of appellate division
cases that were appeals from family court cases. 23 Those cases dis-
cuss family court litigants' right to assigned counsel. Thus, appar-
ently (but by no means explicitly) the Fourth Department was of
the view that the right to assigned counsel in supreme court was
the same as in family court.
Nonetheless, without a statute that explicitly applies to the su-
preme court, indigent parents and others have met with limited and
varied success obtaining assigned counsel in supreme court to assist
19. The Third Department rules are found in N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22, § 822 (2001). It discusses assignments for mental health reasons under Judiciary
Law § 35(1)(a), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 822.1(a) (2001), and also
states that the "court may assign counsel other than in the manner prescribed in
subdivison (a) hereof only when it is satisfied that special circumstances require such
assignment." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 822.1(c) (2001). The Fourth
Department rules do not specifically mention assigned counsel. Id. § 1000.1-.19.
20. See Petkovsek v. Snyder, 674 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1998) (involving at least
seven different appeals by Ms. Petkovsek and seven different memorandum decisions
by the Fourth Department).
21. Id.
22. Id. (Appeal No. 7) (emphasis added). In addition to dismissing her appointed
attorneys, Ms. Petkovsek "represented to the court that she would proceed pro se
and failed to request assigned counsel during the 90-day period before the hearing."
Id.
23. Id. (citing Child Welfare Admin. (John R.) v. Jennifer A., 630 N.Y.S.2d 379
(App. Div. 1995) (mem.)); Mooney v. Mooney, 663 N.Y.S.2d 676 (App. Div. 1997)
(mem.); Mott v. Ransom, (Appeal No. 1), 624 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. Div. 1995)
(mem.). In Petkovsek v. Snyder, (Appeal No. 4) 674 N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. Div. 1998),
the court also held that the supreme court had not denied Ms. Petkovsek her right to
a fair trial by refusing to appoint her a second assigned attorney or adjournment when
she dismissed her assigned attorney on the day of the hearing without showing good
cause. Id.
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them in cases covered by FCA section 261 and SCPA section 407.
This has been true even under the relatively enlightened rules of
the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts. 4
Perhaps the most egregious example of injustice resulting from
this inequitable treatment occurs when the financially solvent cus-
tody litigant chooses to initiate a custody proceeding in supreme
court rather than in family court so that the indigent parent will
have difficulty obtaining an assigned attorney.
I. FACING THE DILEMMA
In 1984, after two unsuccessful attempts to convince the court to
appoint counsel, I brought an Article 78 proceeding25 asking for a
writ of mandamus ordering an Erie County Supreme Court justice
to appoint assigned counsel for an indigent parent who had been
served with a post divorce order to show cause to appear in su-
preme court regarding custody of his child.26 The underlying case
became moot once the matter was referred to family court.27 It did
result, however, in a meeting among then Eighth District Adminis-
trative Judge Kane, the president of the Bar Association of Erie
County, the then administrator of the local Assigned Counsel Pro-
gram,28 an assistant attorney general (representing the supreme
court justice), and myself. Justice Kane agreed that supreme court
24. See supra note 17.
25. Prude v. Sedita, 104 A.D.2d 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Prior to bringing the
Article 78 proceeding, I had appeared twice as amicus curiae in the underlying matter,
Prude v. Prude, Index No. H11524 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 1984), to advise the court of the
indigent parent's right to assigned counsel. At the first appearance, I also provided
the court with a memorandum of law describing two separate grounds for providing
the particular litigant with assigned counsel. Id. The indigent client had court-ordered
custody and his ex-spouse was moving the court for a change in custody. Id. I raised
an equal protection and substantive due process argument based upon Borkowski v.
Borkowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 927 (App. Div. 1977), discussed below. However, the indi-
gent litigant was also threatened with contempt of court and imprisonment for an
alleged violation of a prior visitation order. Id. This right to assigned counsel was
based upon not only FCA section 262, but also section 770 of the Judiciary Law,
section 722 of the County Law, and numerous New York and federal cases holding
that when indigent litigants are threatened with imprisonment, they have a constitu-
tional right to assigned counsel. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972);
Kissel v. Kissel, 399 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (App. Div. 1977); Hickland v. Hickland, 393
N.Y.S.2d 192, 195 (App. Div 1977).
26. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 262 (McKinney 2001) (providing for as-
signment of counsel for indigent persons).
27. Prude v. Prude, 104 A.D.2d 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
28. The then administrator of the Assigned Counsel Program (now retired) indi-
cated that his County Law 18-B funded program was meant to be a criminal defense
program and was never intended to be a family court program (let alone in supreme
court). This type of thinking may still be pervasive, which would add to the impedi-
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justices could make assignments pursuant to FCA section 262 and
agreed to write an internal memo to the supreme court justices in
the Eighth Judicial District informing them of this power.
I became the defacto local protector of this right to assigned
counsel in supreme court. Other local legal services and legal aid
programs were aware of the case that I had brought and they re-
ferred to me clients in need of assigned counsel in supreme court.
Inevitably I would end up talking to the judge's law clerk about
Judge Kane's internal memo (which I had never seen) and about
what was required to get the client assistance from the Assigned
Counsel Program. The process was inefficient, and I am sure that
many people slipped through the cracks and went without counsel.
Nonetheless, I was glad to help in the cases that were brought to
my attention, and my assistance always resulted in referral to the
Assigned Counsel Program and the assignment of an attorney.29
Recently, however, a member of the Board of Directors of the
Assigned Counsel Program indicated that the program does not
assign attorneys for family law matters in the supreme court be-
cause it is not directed by statute to do so. A directive, either in
the form of a statute, court rule, or appellate case decision, is
clearly necessary to effect change. I have discussed this problem
with legal service advocates throughout the state who want to rem-
edy this injustice in their own localities." Their attempts to deal
with this issue locally have only demonstrated the inefficiency of
handling this issue piecemeal.
The Honorable Juanita Bing Newton, Deputy Chief Administra-
tive Judge for Justice Initiatives, called the New York State Unified
Court System Access to Justice Conference, which inspired this ar-
ticle's attempt to bring attention to the issue and, hopefully, plant
the seed for a state-wide solution.
ments that bar indigents from securing assigned counsel in family law matters in su-
preme court.
29. The attempts made were always made pre-divorce, post-divorce, or in custody
disputes between unmarried adults.
30. These advocates include advocates in Suffolk County, Monroe County, Nassau
County, and New York City. The access to justice issues raised by this inequitable
treatment for litigants in supreme court has also been discussed by the New York
State Bar Association (NYSBA) President's Committee on Access to Justice, the
NYSBA Committee on Legal Aid, and the New York Pro Bono Coordinators
Network.
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Judge Newton's staff31 forwarded a request for information to
the team leaders32 of the delegation each judicial district sent to the
conference. Some of the team leaders forwarded the request to
other knowledgeable court personnel within their district. At
about the same time, an identical request for information was sent
to legal services and pro bono programs.
The information request sought to determine whether low in-
come litigants attempting to obtain assigned counsel in the su-
preme court to handle cases for which the litigants would have
obtained counsel in family court were having trouble doing so. It
further surveyed whether there is any mechanism established for
indigent family law litigants to obtain assigned counsel in the su-
preme court, if so, whether such mechanism covers all of the areas
of law covered by FCA section 262, and what indigents do if they
cannot get assigned counsel.33 The responses provided information
on the practices in thirty-six of New York's sixty-two counties.34 Of
the thirty-six counties, twenty-nine (80.5%)35 reportedly have no
31. Thanks to Beverly Russell for all of her help.
32. Team leaders were either the administrative judges or executive assistants for
each district.
33. After an explanation of the issue, the information request included the follow-
ing questions:
1. Do you believe that there is a problem in __ County.
2. Is there an established mechanism to get people assigned counsel for fam-
ily law cases in supreme & surrogate's courts?
3. If so, does it cover all of the types of cases covered by FCA section 262?
Which, if any, are not covered?
4. Are there logistical problems which inhibit the process?
5. If clients cannot get assigned counsel, what do they do?
6. Who is responsible for administering the assigned counsel system that
should be providing counsel in these cases? (please provide e-mail ad-
dress, snail mail address, phone #, fax #, if possible)
34. Survey (on file with author).
35. These included the following twenty-nine counties: New York (First Judicial
District); Richmond, Kings (Second District); Franklin, Essex, Fulton, Montgomery,
Washington (Fourth District); Jefferson, Oneida, Herkimer (Fifth District); Madison,
Ostego, Delaware, Chenango, Broome, Cortland, Tompkins, Tioga, Chemung, Schuy-
ler (Sixth District); Monroe (Seventh District); Niagara (Eighth District); Dutchess,
Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Westchester (Ninth District); and Queens (Eleventh Dis-
trict). Court representatives for several of the counties stated that indigent family law
litigants in the supreme court must either represent themselves or attempt to obtain
assistance from a legal aid program or a pro bono attorney. Inclusion on this list does
not mean that an empirical review of actual cases in the counties listed would abso-
lutely show a serious problem. However, people (working for the courts or in legal
assistance programs for low income people) in those counties and in a position to be
aware of problems that clients face in their attempts to obtain assigned counsel, have
replied that they perceive that this problem exists in their counties. Additionally, no
response was received from court personnel or legal services advocates for twenty-six
2002] 1133
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mechanism established for indigent family law litigants to obtain
assigned counsel in supreme court. Contacts for the court system in
three counties36 reported that they have a functional system in
place.37
In four other counties, it seems some indigent family law litigants
in supreme court can obtain assigned counsel, while others can-
not.38 In two of these counties (Onondaga and Nassau), it simply
depends upon which supreme court justice is assigned the case. 39
In one county, litigants involved in original custody disputes could
obtain assigned counsel in either family court or supreme court,
but litigants involved in a modification of custody proceeding could
not obtain assigned counsel in either supreme or family court.4 °
In Erie County, pursuant to an Administrative Rule, all post-
divorce custody and visitation matters brought within eighteen
months of the divorce judgment must be heard in supreme court.41
Indigent litigants in those particular post-divorce cases can and do
routinely obtain assigned counsel. However, as discussed earlier,
the status of attempts by those who do not fit into this group is in
doubt.
Thus, the above look around the state indicates that not only
does the likelihood of actually receiving assigned counsel drop off
significantly if you end up in supreme court instead of family court,
but the court rules vary dramatically from judicial department to
judicial department, and within each department the informal sur-
vey shows variances in practice do not even break down by judicial
district. They, at best, vary by county. At worst, even within a
county, it depends upon which judge your cases are assigned to.
of New York's counties. Presumably, if responses were received from all twenty-six of
those counties, many of them would appear on this list.
36. The different court personnel replying for Schenectady and St. Lawrence
Counties (both in the Fourth Judicial District) reported no problems in those coun-
ties. The established mechanism is triggered by a litigant filling out an application
form that covers all types of cases within FCA section 262. They reported that there
are no logistical problems with the system. The response on behalf of Suffolk County
Courts (Tenth Judicial District) reported that they have an informal system for all
cases covered under FCA section 262.
37. Survey (on file with author)
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. If this actually is the practice in Chautauqua County, then it raises another
concern. FCA section 262(a)(iii) and (v) do not exclude litigants in modification pro-
ceedings from those that are entitled to assigned counsel.
41. . Administrative Rule RE: Modification of Divorce Decrees Involving Cus-
tody and Visitation, Justice Doyle, Administrative Judge, Eight Judicial District (ef-
fective Oct. 1, 1999).
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This inequity in litigant treatment should offend all fair-minded
people and should be particularly disturbing to our courts, as the
guardians and dispensers of justice.
II. COURT DECISIONS
There are only two published decisions dealing directly with this
issue.42 Each is a supreme court decision. Unfortunately, the anal-
yses and conclusions of these two decisions are in conflict.
In Borkowski v. Borkowski,4 3 Justice Pine was faced with an in-
digent defendant's request for assigned counsel in a divorce case
where custody was in dispute.4 She first noted that in In re Smiley,
the New York Court of Appeals had decided that a divorce litigant
"has no constitutional right to have the court assign and compen-
sate counsel."'4 5 Justice Pine went on to find that In re Smiley was
controlling for the case presented to her, unless there has been a
"legislative change".46 She then wrote:
However, subsequent to the Smiley decision, the legislature en-
acted section 262(a)(v) of the Family Court Act requiring the
court to assign compensated counsel to an indigent parent seek-
ing or contesting the substantial infringement of his right to
custody.
If the custody issue in this divorce action were referred to Fam-
ily Court, pursuant to section 652 of the Family Court Act, the
42. There have been several related unpublished decisions since the enactment of
FCA sections 261 and 262. In re Burrows, No. 45271-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). Like
Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396. NYS2d 962 (NY Sup. Ct. 1977) (discussed below), it
involved a request for assigned counsel in a divorce action and resulted in the indigent
litigant being granted assigned counsel only for the custody issue. Id. Even though
this case was decided sixteen years after Borkowski, it did not cite Borkowski. Id.
Instead, the court wrote, "[T]his court may appoint counsel pursuant to Judiciary Law
Section 35(b), in the same manner that counsel is appointed in Family Court, pursuant
to Family Court Act Section 262(a)(v)." Id. It is unclear to what section of the Judici-
ary Law the Judge was referring. There is no section 35(b). A section 35-b was subse-
quently enacted, but not until 1995 (two years after the decision in In re Burrows).
The section deals with "[a]ssignment of counsel and related services in criminal ac-
tions in which a death sentence may be imposed." N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 35(b) (Mc-
Kinney 2001). More likely, the judge was referring to section 35(1)(b), but that
section deals with the power of the court of appeals and the appellate division to
appoint counsel in appeals from criminal cases, family court matters, and surrogate's
court matters. § 35(1)(b). This is another example of the confusion surrounding this
issue.
43. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
44. Id. at 958.
45. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing In Re
Smiley, 330 N.E.2d. 53 (N.Y. 1975)).
46. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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defendant would now be entitled to assigned counsel in that
court. Clearly, Supreme Court may exercise every power of
Family Court.47
Borkowski held that the right to assigned counsel "extends only
to the issue of custody" and resulted in the defendant being as-
signed counsel for the custody issue only.48
The Borkowski court, without the necessity of reaching the con-
stitutional issues of equal protection and due process which might
have required the supreme court to assign compensated counsel,
found that it had the power to assign compensated counsel if it
chose to do so-and then, did choose to do so 9.4  The logic of the
Borkowski decision is bolstered by other court decisions that have
held that, at least in some instances, the supreme court must follow
the substantive and procedural rules of the FCA.5 °
The only other published opinion that directly tackles this issue
is a Suffolk County decision, McGee v. McGee.51 McGee is one of
a series of at least eleven cases presented to at least seven different
supreme court justices in Suffolk County during the late 1990s.5 2
Of the eleven cases, five resulted in the granting of compensated
assigned counsel;53 three were transferred to family court, where
47. Id. at 958 (citing Kagen v. Kagen, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. 1968)).
48. Id. at 959.
49. Id. at 961-62.
50. Pierot v. Pierot, 373 N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div. 1975); Levy v. Levy, 362
N.Y.S.2d 15 (App. Div. 1974); People v. DeJesus, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317, 322 (App. Div.
1964).
51. McGee v. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
52. The motions requesting assigned counsel in these eleven cases were all made
by the Touro Law Center by, or under the direction of, attorney Jane Reinhardt.
53. Garner v. Garner, Index No. 18991-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998) (ap-
pointing counsel to defendant for custody issue only in divorce); Olivieri v. Olivieri,
Index No. 91-22317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 9, 1998) (appointing counsel appointed to
respondent in post divorce motion for change of custody); Neftleberg v. Neftleberg,
Index No. 30418-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24,1998) (relying upon Garner, counsel was
appointed to respondent in post divorce visitation dispute); Torregrossa v. Tor-
regrossa, Index No. 92-15193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 1999) (appointing counsel to
respondent in post divorce motion for change of custody); Nielson v. Nielson, Index
No. #96-294 (NY Sup. Ct. undated, no written decision) (Justice Blydenburgh trans-
ferred the custody issue in a divorce to Judicial Hearing Officer Freidenberg, who
apparently appointed counsel to defendant on issue of custody only); Memorandum
From Lewis Silverman and Jane Reinhardt, Esqs., Touro Law Center, Regarding:
Publicly Compensated Counsel for Supreme Court Custody Cases (June 1999).
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the indigent parent presumably received assigned counsel;54 and in
two the issue was ruled moot."
The eleventh Suffolk County Case was McGee v. McGee, in
which the court agreed with the Borkowski opinion that "the Su-
preme Court is constitutionally empowered to exercise every
power of the Family Court. '5 6 However, unlike Borkowski, the
court concluded that "in this case, the court is of the opinion that
to assume to itself the empowerment of Family Court Act section
262 would be inappropriate. 5 7 In dicta, however, Justice Oliver
made statements that would seem to indicate that he would never
find a case that would be "appropriate" for using his power to ap-
ply FCA section 262 to assign counsel in supreme court:
For the Supreme Court to be consistent with the body of law
relating to appointment of free counsel to indigent litigants in
civil actions, it would appear more suitable to leave this legisla-
tive dispensation exactly where the Legislature placed it: the
Family Court.58
The Judge in McGee could have referred the child custody issue
to family court, but instead declined:
Until defendant has presented proof of her own indigence and
that of plaintiff, this court is loath to refer the custody part of
this case to Family Court, even if that financial circumstance
were, alone, sufficient reason to warrant a transfer.59
54. Roethel v. Roethel, Index No. 4380-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar. 5, 1999)) (refer-
ring post divorce motion for change of custody to family court); Vogt v. Vogt, Index
No. 91-10400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000) (referring post divorce motion for change of
custody to family court); Moore v. Moore, Index No. 93-7961 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20,
1998) (referring post divorce custody matter to family court).
55. In Pirolo v. Pirolo, Index No. 97-03464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1998), the court
found that the party requesting assigned counsel did not meet the test for indigence.
In Mauro v. Mauro, Index No. 84-2604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. undated, no written decision),
the underlying motion regarding visitation was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction be-
cause the parties' children were all over eighteen years of age.
56. McGee v. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (citing Borkowski v. Bor-
kowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977) and Kagen v. Kagen, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195
(N.Y. 1968)).
57. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
58. Id. The Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, which are covered by the As-
signment of Counsel Rule at N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 678.11 (2002)
and the Tenth Judicial District, which includes Nassau County where the McGee case
was heard, all fall within the Second Judicial Department.
59. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (emphasis added). Regarding the power to trans-
fer the custody matter to the Family Court, see Kagen v. Kagen, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195
(N.Y. 1968).
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This finding was made even though the defendant had submitted
a sworn affidavit stating that she was receiving public assistance
and had no savings.6" The court did not cite any authority in sup-
port of requiring that the defendant prove the indigence of the op-
posing party in order to obtain appointed counsel.6 1
This reasoning shows a lack of understanding of the plight of the
indigent person called into an important and probably confusing
legal proceeding. The court seems to be considering fee shifting62
and the possibility of ordering the opposing party to pay for some
or all of the indigent litigant's attorney's fees.63 Fee shifting is an
important factor in leveling the playing field and facilitates access
to justice for some low income parties. It works, however, only
where the indigent party has an attorney whose fees can be paid by
the other side. An indigent parent facing a custody battle and lack-
ing money for even an initial retainer fee can have a difficult or
impossible time finding an attorney to take her case on the hope of
obtaining a fee award (and collecting it from the opposing party).
If she cannot find an attorney to take her case, then the possibility
that her non-existent attorney will be paid by the opposing side is
of little comfort.
The McGee court goes on to discuss the indigent defendant's
claim that denial of her request for appointed counsel on the issue
of custody in supreme court would amount to a denial of her con-
stitutional right to equal protection. 64 The court quickly dismissed
that notion because it believed that there were not even two classes
of people to look at to see if they were receiving unequal treat-
ment. The Court stated that the defendant
argu[es] that a failure by the Supreme Court to apply Family
Court Act section 262 to a case before the Supreme Court is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clauses, reasoning that the
Legislature wrongly created two classes: "one class of poor cus-
tody-case litigants (parties in Family Court)" where free legal
60. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
61. Id. at 273. The McGee court neither cites nor addresses In re Ella B., 285
N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972), People v. Smith. 465 N.E.2d 336 (N.Y. 1984), or the important
constitutional cases cited in In re Ella B.: Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and
Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), regarding the fundamental interest that
parents have in the care and custody of their children. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982).
62. Fee shifting is allocating the costs of private litigation. Martha Pacold, Attor-
ney's Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007
(2001).
63. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
64. Id. at 276-77.
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counsel is available while denying such free legal counsel to "a
similarly situated class of poor custody-case litigants (parties in
Supreme Court)." The court finds this argument to be founded
on a faulty premise. The "class" is comprised of indigent persons
in child custody litigation. What defendant is arguing is forum,
not class. All persons in the class who qualify are entitled to
free legal counsel in the Family Court. Defendant argues that,
as a member of the class, she is entitled to select her forum.
However, the Legislature has already done that and selected the
Family Court.65
While Justice Oliver may have assumed that the legislature has
selected the family court as the forum for those qualifying for free
legal counsel,66 unfortunately for this indigent defendant, the plain-
tiff trumped what the court called the "Legislature's selection" and
forced her to litigate the child custody case in the supreme court.67
Even if McGee's view of the "class" is correct for plaintiffs who can
decide in which forum to litigate their action, it is a cruel joke to
tell an indigent defendant (with no control over when or where the
action was initiated) that he will be denied assigned counsel in su-
preme court because he should be litigating in family court,68 -and
then refuse to transfer the custody issue to family court.
In trying to bolster its argument that there was not a denial of
the indigent defendant's equal protection rights, the court stated
that "no argument can be made that the defendant has more rights
or better protections in Supreme Court than in Family Court. '69
Again, the court missed the point. The problem is not that the
defendant has "more rights or better protections in Supreme
Court," it is that she has less: she was forced to litigate the child
custody issue in supreme court without the assistance of an
attorney.
65. Id. at 276.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 277.
68. Justice Oliver's discussion raises another due process and equal protection is-
sue. If, as he stated-the legislature, in essence, decided that poor litigants will liti-
gate child custody cases in only family court, while wealthier litigants could choose
either the family court or the supreme court-would such a statute stand up to a
constitutional challenge?
69. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 277. Justice Oliver also questioned whether custody
cases were meant to be included in those described in FCA section 261 as involving
"the loss of a child's society" and/or involving constitutional protection. Id. at 274.
The legislative history of chapter 682, section 2 of the Laws of 1975 which enacted
FCA section 261 makes it clear that child custody cases were meant to be included in
both the phrase "the loss of a child's society," and the constitutional protection. See
infra text accompanying note 88.
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What is equally disturbing about the McGee court's opinion is
that within its discussion of the equal protection issue, the court
raises the cost of assigned counsel as an important concern. 70 Even
though the court had earlier found that it had the power to act
under FCA section 262 but decided it was "inappropriate" to do
so, 7 1 the court wrote:
Should the Supreme Court open the Pandora's box of free coun-
sel for indigent litigants in civil actions where the litigant claims
an unenumerated constitutional right or some "fundamental in-
terest?" The court thinks not. These matters involving the pub-
lic treasurer and treasury must be left to the Legislature. This
financial thicket is no place for the courts.72
Not all courts agree that cost to the public is a sufficient reason
for the courts not to determine whether indigent litigants have a
constitutional right to assigned counsel.73 Three years before FCA
sections 261 and 262 were enacted, the New York Court of Appeals
found that parents in parental rights termination proceedings were
entitled to assigned counsel and that to deny that right would be a
denial of due process and equal protection.74
In looking at the fifteen cases discussed above where the court
was asked to provide assigned counsel for a custody issue, fourteen
of the fifteen requests were for an indigent litigant that was in a
defensive posture.7 1 They were either a divorce defendant or re-
sponding to an Order to Show Cause or motion regarding child
custody. They had no control over which forum was selected. Al-
though a divorce plaintiff could arguably choose to file a family
70. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
71. Id. at 275
72. Id. at 279.
73. In re Ella B., 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1972).
74. Id. at 136. Here, the equal protection claim was based merely on the fact that
the statute allowed those that could afford to pay for counsel to have their counsel
present. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75. Prude v. Prude, Index No. H11524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Borkowski v. Bor-
kowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); McGee v. McGee, 694 N.Y.S.2d 269
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); In re Burrows, Index No. 45271.-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Garner
v. Garner, Index No. 18991-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); Olivieri v. Olivieri, Index No. 91-
22317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); Neftleberg v. Neftleberg, Index No. 30418-95 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1998); Torregrossa v. Torregrossa, Index No. 92-15193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); Niel-
son v. Nielson, Index No. #96-294 (NY Sup. Ct. undated, no written decision);
Roethel v. Roethel, Index No. 4380-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); Vogt v. Vogt, Index No.
91-10400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Moore v. Moore, Index No. 93-7961 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998); Pirolo v. Pirolo, Index No. 97-03464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); Mauro v. Mauro,
Index No. 84-2604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. (undated, no written decision). Only in In re Petkov-
sek, 674 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1998), was the person requesting assigned counsel
the one who had initiated the proceedings in supreme court.
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court petition to decide the custody issue before filing a divorce
action, and a party that initiates a child custody proceeding could
chose to do so in family court,76 an indigent parent or guardian that
finds herself summoned to supreme court does not have the luxury
of choice. Their unenviable situation makes the most compelling
case for the need of a clearly articulated pronouncement of their
right to assigned counsel in supreme court.
HI. THE LAW GUARDIAN ANALOGY
The history of the plight of indigent adults in custody matters in
supreme court is, unfortunately, not unique. Until the passage of
FCA sections 261 and 262, there was similar confusion about the
appointment of assigned counsel in the family court.77 After the
statutory establishment of the right to compensation for law guard-
ians of minors who were subjects of certain family court proceed-
ings, there was confusion and lack of uniformity about appointing
law guardians in similar types of proceedings in the supreme
court.7 8
FCA section 249 sets out circumstances in which the family court
shall appoint law guardians for minors and other circumstances
where the family court judge may appoint a law guardian. 79 Bor-
kowski v. Borkowski was also the leading case for the proposition
that a supreme court judge could exercise all of the powers of a
family court judge under FCA section 249.80 In order to make it
clear that supreme and surrogate's court judges could exercise the
same powers as the family court judge in ensuring that the ap-
pointed law guardians received compensation (thus better assuring
that law guardians would be found), the legislature added subsec-
tion 7 to section 35 of the Judiciary Law:
Whenever the supreme court or the surrogate's court shall ap-
point counsel in a proceeding over which the family court might
have exercised jurisdiction had such proceeding been com-
menced in family court or referred thereto pursuant to law, and
76. An exception is a post divorce proceeding where the supreme court has re-
tained exclusive jurisdiction for future issues regarding custody.
77. Laws of 1975, chapter 682 included FCA sections 261 and 262. In its Bill
Jacket, see Letter from Michael R. Juviler, New York Office of Court Administration,
to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (July 22, 1975).
78. Jennifer Frey, Divorce Judges Seeking More Pro Bono Counsel, MANHATTAN
LAw., Feb. 16-22, 1988, at 1.
79. Appointment of law guardians in custody disputes is not mandated, but within
the judge's discretion. N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac-T § 249 (McKinney 2001).
80. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964-65 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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under circumstances whereby, if such proceeding were pending
in family court, such court would be authorized by section two
hundred forty-nine of the family court act to appoint a law
guardian, such counsel shall be compensated in accordance with
the provisions of this section.81
The wording of this subsection is somewhat confusing because
the precatory and final language talks about appointing "counsel"
instead of appointing a "law guardian," as it does in the middle. A
broad reading might include cases where the supreme or surro-
gate's court appoints counsel to adults under FCA section 262, as
long as a law guardian could be appointed in family court under
FCA section 249. The legislative history, however, shows that this
amendment was aimed solely at resolving the funding of law guard-
ians for minors.8 2
The analogy between the FCA section 249 problem, which was
solved by Judiciary Law section 35(7), and the FCA section 262
problem, which still needs to be addressed, is apparent in the con-
clusion of Assembly Member Oliver Koppell's letter of support for
the passage of Judiciary Law section 35(7):
Each year, thousands of children are affected by judicial pro-
ceedings in New York State. It is ironic that we recognize their
legal rights in Family Court, but not in other courts. This over-
sight must be corrected by authorizing the compensation of law
guardians in Supreme and Surrogate [sic] Courts, thus ensuring
that, where appropriate, counsel will be appointed and the
child's interests will be protected.83
81. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(7) (McKinney 2001). Subsection 7 was enacted in 1989
and became effective in 1990. Subsection 5 of the same statute provides that the
compensation shall be a state charge.
82. Mem. of Sen. John R. Dunne, in 1.989 LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 252. Senator
Dunne was the sponsor of the bill in the senate. His memorandum states, in part:
This measure would add a new subdivision seven to section 35 of the Judici-
ary Law to provide that whenever the Supreme Court or a Surrogate's Court
appoints counsel for a minor to fill a role comparable to that of a law guard-
ian (FCA § 249) such counsel shall be compensated with State funds.
Unfortunately, his memo explaining the legislation was more clearly written than the
statute that was created. Regarding the intended meaning of N.Y. Jud. Law § 35(7),
see, Bill Jacket to Laws of 1989, ch. 571, § 1. The Senate bill was S. 3571. The Assem-
bly bill was A. 5912. At pages 5 and 6, respectively, letters from the bills' sponsors,
Sen. John R. Dunne and Assembly. Member G. Oliver Koppell, show they believed
the supreme and surrogate's court already had the power to appoint law guardians for
minors and that this legislation was to ensure that those law guardians were paid. The
same is true for the report submitted by the Office of Budget, Laws of 1989, ch. 571,
Bill Jacket § 1, at 8-9, and the report submitted by the Office of Court Administration
in favor of the bill's passage, Laws of 1989, ch. 571, Bill Jacket § 1, at 10-11).
83. Id. at 6.
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CONCLUSION
Twelve years after the protection of the rights of minors was en-
sured by the addition of Judiciary Law section 35(7), confusion and
inequitable treatment for the rights of adults remains in those same
cases in the supreme court. The decision in McGee illustrates there
is a real problem for indigent adults trying to obtain assigned coun-
sel in supreme court. This is particularly alarming because the im-
balance of power created by only one parent having an attorney is
likely to affect the outcome of proceedings where the court's ulti-
mate goal is to determine the best interests of the child.84 In its
memorandum supporting passage of FCA sections 261 and 262, the
New York Department of Social Services advised:
If the State is to continue to seek out the best interests of the
child and yet preserve the individual rights of all persons having
a legal interest in the child, it must recognize that the time-
honored system of assuring representation of counsel is proba-
bly the best method of insuring the protection of individual
rights.8 5
The Office of Court Administration had drafted and requested
the introduction of the bill which created FCA sections 261 and
262.86 In recommending that the governor sign the bill into law,
the Office of Court Administration stated: "This measure is a long
overdue restatement of New York law, and is limited by its terms
to instances where there is a constitutionally mandated obligation
to assign counsel for poor persons involved in Family Court pro-
ceedings and subsequent appeals."8 "
The Office of Court Administration's letter, which became part
of the bill's legislative history, went on to say that FCA sections
261 and 262 covered all "proceedings where assignment of counsel
to adults in Family Court proceedings is constitutionally mandated.
Specifically, these include [among others] any proceeding involving
the issue of custody .... -88
84. Daghir v. Daghir, 439 N.E.2d 324 (N.Y. 1982); Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer,
432 N.E.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. 1982); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 287 (N.Y. 1976).
85. Laws of 1975, Chapter 682, Bill Jacket, Memorandum Accompanying Com-
ments on Bills Before the Governor for Executive Action, from New York State De-
partment of Social Services 2 (Aug. 1, 1975).
86. Laws of 1975, Chapter 682, Bill Jacket, Letter from Michael R. Juviler, New
York Office of Court Administration, to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor
(July 22, 1975).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2. The other types of cases covered by FCA section 262 were also listed
in the letter.
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Now, after the years of working with FCA sections 261 and 262,
the courts routinely move without question or delay to provide for
the assignment of counsel to indigent family court adult litigants
involved in proceedings listed in FCA section 262. Indeed, just two
years ago the Second Department, in deciding an appeal from a
family court matter, wrote:
The assistance of counsel in child custody proceedings helps as-
sure that determinations concerning the fundamental parental
rights identified in Matter of Ella B. (supra),89 and those con-
cerning the best interests of a child, are not made without a fully
developed record, after a full and fair hearing. Thus, in a child
custody proceeding, a parent must be afforded a meaningful op-
portunity to appear and to present evidence and arguments in
his or her favor, which includes the right to the assistance of
counsel. 90
It is difficult to understand how these interests are any different
in the supreme court. It would benefit children, parents, the court,
and our system of justice to ensure that the constitutional right to
assigned counsel afforded and protected in family court be just as
vigorously afforded and protected in the supreme court.
The courts, bar associations, legal services programs, and pro
bono programs recently came together to collaborate on access to
justice issues. 91 This paper has attempted to present a distinct, real,
and gravely important access to justice issue around which that col-
laboration may congeal. What could be more devastating in the
lives of parents or guardians than to face the loss of their children
because they cannot obtain assigned counsel-especially, if the op-
posing party and their counsel have selected the supreme court as
the forum, thus making it difficult or impossible for the indigent
adult to obtain the assigned counsel that they would so readily ob-
tain in family court. I hope, for the sake of the children involved,
their indigent parents and guardians, the courts, and, indeed, our
system of justice, that we are up to the task of correcting this over-
sight in the law.
89. In re Ella B., 285 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
90. McNeill v. Ressel, 692 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (App. Div. 1999) (citations omitted).
91. The Access to Justice Conference was held on September 11-12, 2001 in Al-
bany, New York.
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